We consider the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance but without the exclusivity constraint. It turns out that there always exists a unique equilibrium, in which the reliable and unreliable consumers take out a primary insurance up to its quantity limit, and the unreliable take out further secondary insurance at a higher premium. We provide a simple proof of this result (extended to multiple types of consumers) with the hope that it may be pedagogically useful.
Introduction
Rothschild and Stiglitz ([8] ) famously described a model of adverse selection in insurance markets in which …rms could set quantity limits in order to hold down the number of unreliable clients they might have to face. They assumed that …rms could demand exclusivity from their clients, and focused attention on a "separating" equilibrium in which reliable and unreliable clients took out completely di¤erent contracts. This separating equilibrium often did not exist, but was unique when it did.
Many di¤erent authors, starting with Jaynes ( [7] ) and including several others (see, e.g., [1] , [2] , [3] , [5] , [6] , and the references therein) considered dropping the Stony Brook Center for Game Theory; and Cowles Foundation, Yale University. y Cowles Foundation, Yale University; and Santa Fe Institute. exclusivity constraint in speci…c economic contexts, and pointed to a di¤erent equilibrium in which both types take out a common primary insurance up to its quantity limit, and then the unreliable take out a further secondary insurance on their own at higher premium 1 . Two recent papers (see Attar et al [3] and Stiglitz et al [9] ) show that this primary-secondary equilibrium always exists and is unique. The model in [3] is more general than that of Rothschild-Stiglitz (see Remark 5) , while in [9] …rms are permitted to use far more complex strategies than in Rothschild-Stiglitz. In this paper, we go back to the basic model of Rothschild-Stiglitz, with just one amendment: contracts o¤ered by …rms are no longer exclusive, so that a consumer may take out contracts from as many …rms as he likes. In all other respects, our model is no di¤erent from that of Rothschild-Stiglitz. This enables us to give a simple proof of the existence and uniqueness of primary-secondary insurance equilibrium (extended, in a natural manner, to any number of consumer-types, provided they can be ranked in terms of their reliability), which we hope will be of interest, at least from the pedagogical standpoint.
The Model
We describe the simplest model of insurance, in which each consumer begins with an endowment of one unit of the consumption good in her good (no-accident) state and nothing in her bad (accident) state. An insurance contract ( ; Q) ; where 2 2 R ++ and Q 2 R ++ ; allows any consumer to choose any non-negative amount z Q of insurance, by paying a premium z in both states in order to receive nothing in her good state and z in her bad state. We suppose a …xed interest rate, for convenience taken to be 0, so that in her good state the consumer ends up losing z; but gains on net (1 )z in her bad state. If the consumer has probability p of an accident, then the insurance is actuarially fair (or, unfair) to her if = p (or, > p):
1 Indeed, we ourselves pointed to this equilibrium (see [4] ), albeit in a di¤erent setting, where perfect competition substituted for free entry. To be precise, all conceivable contracts, most of which were not actively traded in equilibrium, were priced in [4] by the "invisible hand" of perfect competition (i.e., by the market forces of supply and demand). In e¤ect, there was not just a continuum of consumer-clients in [4] , but also a continuum of supplier-…rms. There could be no question of an entrant …rm upsetting the equilibrium, because its actions had no a¤ect on market supply and it could not even be seen. 2 By quoting exorbitantly high and any Q > 0; a …rm can ensure that no customer will come to it, and thus can abstain from participating in the market (i.e., the strict positivity of Q does not force participation). We assume Q > 0 because it makes for a cleaner presentation. (Allowing Q = 0 would not alter the …nal results, or add any analytical insights, but just necessitate more notation.) Thus a consumer who takes out z Q units of the insurance contract ( ; Q) and begins with goods y = (y G ; y B ); will wind up consuming y G z in her good state, and y B + (1 )z in her bad state. As z moves from 0 to Q; her consumption traverses the straight line segment with slope (1 )= from y to y 0 (where y 0 is obtained by setting z = Q): We denote this segment by y ! ;Q y 0 : Let S = f( ; Q) : 2 R ++ ; Q 2 2 R ++ g denote the strategy set of each …rm, consisting of contracts ( ; Q): Insurance contracts are non-exclusive: each consumer may choose as many contracts as she wishes.
Given a strategy-pro…le = ( n ; Q n ) N n=1 2 S N of …rms 1; : : : ; N (where N is arbitrary), we de…ne the consumption polygon ( ) as follows. First let 1 ( ) < 2 ( ) < : : : < L ( ) denote the …rst-lowest, second-lowest, ..., L th -lowest values among 1 ; : : : ; N ; let N l ( ) = fn 2 N : n = l ( )g be the set of …rms quoting the l th -rate, and let Q l ( ) = P n2N l ( ) Q n be the total quantity o¤ered by them. Then ( ) is the polygonal curve in R 2 + that starts at y 0 = (1; 0) on the horizontal axis; goes up …rst by the amount Q 1 ( ) at the rate (slope) (1 1 ( ))= 1 ( ); next by the amount Q 2 ( ) at the rate (1 2 ( ))= 2 ( ); and so on, getting truncated at the point where it hits the vertical axis (if it happens to get that far by the L th step). More precisely,
Since premiums `a re increasing with`, the polygonal curve is concave. Let the consumer-types be denoted 1; : : : ; T whose population measures are 1 ; : : : ; T ; and whose bad states occur with probabilities p 1 ; : : : ; p T respectively, with 0 < p 1 < p 2 < : : : < p T ; i.e., type 1 is the most "reliable", and type T is least so. The utility function of type t is denoted u t : R 2 + ! R and is assumed to be continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly concave. Furthermore the standard single crossing property is assumed, i.e., denoting consumptions in the good and bad states by x G and x B respectively, we have: if t > t 0 then, at any point (x G ; x B ) 2 R 2 + , the indi¤erence curve of u t lies strictly below that of u t 0 to the left of the point and strictly above it to the right. A canonical example is given by
for some strictly monotonic and strictly concave utility u:
It is clear that (i) on account of the strict concavity of u t , any consumer of type t will maximize u t on ( ) at a unique point x t ( ) 2 ( ) (in particular, all consumers of type t will consume the same bundle);
(ii) on account of the single crossing property, as t increases, x t ( ) will advance weakly on ( ) further away from the initial endowment (1; 0); more precisely, at any level l of ( ); consumer-type t will take out strictly more insurance than the more reliable type t 0 < t, unless both have reached the quantity limit Q l ( ) : Given a polygon ( ); a consumer of type t who takes out insurance (z t1 ( ); :::; z tL ( )) at each of the L levels, will end up consuming x t ( ) = (x tG ( ); x tB ( )); where
It is also clear that (iii) the consumer will exhaust the better contracts before starting the lesser contracts, hence z`( ) > 0 implies that z j ( ) = Q j ( ) for all j <`; and z`( ) = 0 implies that z j ( ) = 0 for all j >`:
For ease of presentation 3 , we suppose that if z t`( ) < Q`( ), then the consumer takes out a pro rata share of the quantities o¤ered on level`; i.e. she takes out the amount z
It follows that not only is the …nal consumption x t ( ) a deterministic function of ; but so are the amounts z n t ( ) of insurance that any consumer type t takes out from each …rm n = 1; : : : ; N in order to get to x t ( ) . Now, recalling that t is the population measure of type t; the pro…t F n ( ) of …rm n is
It will be useful to speak of the unit cost P T t=1 t z n t ( )p t = P T t=1 t z n t ( ); whenever the denominator is positive (i.e. level`has active consumers), so that pro…t
Observe that, by the pro rata rule, every …rm charging the same premium will incur the same unit cost.
De…nition 1 (Equilibrium).A strategy pro…le = (( 1 ; Q 1 ) ; : : : ; N ; Q N ) is called an equilibrium if: (a) no …rm makes a loss, i.e, F n ( ) 0 for n = 1; : : : ; N ; (b) no entrant …rm N + 1 can make a pro…t, i.e., there is no (entrant) strategy
Theorem 2 (Existence and Uniqueness) There exists an equilibrium, and across all equilibria the consumptions of the consumers are invariant.
We shall prove this in the next two sections, and give an explicit description of the unique equilibrium consumptions.
Existence of Equilibrium
De…nition 3 (Canonical strategy pro…le): Let i = P T l=i l p l ; for i = 1; : : : ; T: Let Q 1 be the amount of insurance that a consumer of type 1 would take out at the premium 1 if there were no quantity constraints on her. De…ne Q i inductively as the amount of insurance that a consumer of type t would take out at the premium i if there were no quantity constraints on her and she had already taken out Q 1 at 1 ; Q 2 at 2 ; : : : ;and Q i 1 at i 1 . Now take the set of …rms to also be 1; : : : ; T; i.e., one …rm for each consumer-type; and de…ne = (( 1 ; Q 1 ) ; : : : ; ( T ; Q T )) to be the canonical strategy pro…le. (If Q i = 0; then …rm i is understood to have been dropped.)
It is worth noting that in the canonical strategy pro…le, the contract ( i ; Q i ) is not taken out by any type t < i; and is taken out until the quantity limit Q i by all types t i: Moreover, for each Q i > 0; the premium i is set equal to its unit cost, so all contracts make zero pro…t.
Lemma 4
The canonical strategy pro…le is an equilibrium.
Proof. We need only verify that no new …rm has incentive to enter. Consider a potential entrant. If it quotes premium < 1 , then (by (ii) and (iii)) all types will go to it, taking out nondecreasing amounts insurance as we descend the reliability ladder, so that the entrant's unit cost will be at least P T t=1 t p t = 1 ; while its premium is strictly less, so it will make a loss. Next if it quotes = i for any i; then it gets the same mix of customers (by our pro-rata rule) as …rm i did in ; and therefore makes the same zero pro…t. Finally, if it quotes any with i < < i+1 , it will attract only types i + 1; : : : ; T so that its unit cost will be at least P T t=i+1 t p t = i+1 ; while its premium is strictly less, so it will make a loss. If it quotes > T , it will attract no one and therefore make no pro…t.
Uniqueness of Equilibrium Consumptions
Lemma 5 Let be any strategy pro…le at which there is a non-empty set J = ft : z t`( ) > 0g of active consumer-types on level l of ( ). Then, for small enough " > 0; the strategy ( l ( ) "; ") enables an entrant …rm to come in and earn the premium l ( ) " while incurring unit cost no more than P t2J t p t ; which in turn is no more than the common unit cost c of each active …rm in at level`: Furthermore, if J has at least two consumer types, and if the most reliable consumer in J is not taking out the full quantity Q`( ) of insurance at level`; then the entrant's unit cost is at most P t2J t p t < c for all small enough ":
Proof. Denote by " = ( ; ( ("); ")) the polygon formed after the entry, where (") = l ( ) ": As " ! 0; the polygon " coverges to ( ): Hence, by (i), each consumer-type's optimal choice on " converges to her optimal choice in ( ): Since all the types in J take out positive insurance at premium l ( ) in ( ); they must be doing so in " (for small enough "): However no one takes out insurance at premium l ( ) in " before exhausting possibilities at the lower premium (") available in " : Hence all the consumer-types in J take out the same insurance up to the available limit " at premium (") in " : This implies that the unit cost incurred by the entrant from J is P t2J t p t : On the other hand, invoking (ii), the reliabilty mix of consumer types at level`of ( ) is no better than at ("); thus P t2J t p t c: In addition, there may be some other consumer-types J 0 who also simultaneously take out insurance at premium (") in " but then everyone in J 0 must be more reliable than the most reliable in J: This further lowers the unit cost of the entrant and the desired conclusion hold with even more force. Finally, if the most reliable consumer j in J was not taking out full insurance in and other consumers are present in J; then (again by (ii)) these others strictly worsen the reliability mix in at premium l ( ); compared to the mix at ("); implying
Lemma 6 At any equilibrium, all …rms make zero pro…ts.
Proof. Any …rm i making a positive pro…t must have unit cost strictly below its premium. By Lemma 5, an entrant can charge an arbitrarily smaller premium and yet incur no higher unit cost, thus making a pro…t and contradicting equilibrium.
Lemma 7
At any equilibrium, all consumptions are the same as in the canonical strategy pro…le :
Proof. Let be any equilibrium. We shall show inductively that all consumertypes t = 1; : : : ; T consume the same in as in ; starting with type 1:
Assume that 1 < T . (The case 1 = T will be considered later.) We claim that (a consumer of type) 1 takes out no insurance in if, and only if, she takes out no insurance in : For suppose she takes out positive insurance in but none in : This implies that the premium 1 ( ) > 1 ( ) 1 : Let an entrant come in at and o¤er ( 1 + "; ") : For small enough "; it follows from (i) and (ii), that all types will take this contract up to the limit "; so that the unit cost of the entrant is P T t=1 t p t 1 which is strictly less than its premium, so that the entrant makes a pro…t, a contradiction. Conversely suppose that type 1 takes out positive insurance in but none in : Then 1 ( ) < 1 : However, by (ii), the unit cost of …rms quoting 1 ( ) is at least P T t=1 t p t 1 ; which is more than the premium 1 ( ) they are charging, hence these incumbent …rms make losses at , again a contradiction. This veri…es our claim.
In view of the claim, it remains to consider the case where 1 takes out positive insurance in both and : We shall establish that 1 ( ) = 1 and that all of Q 1 ( ) is taken out by 1, and that 1 does not proceed further onto the second level of ( ).
Suppose that 1 takes out less than the full quantity Q 1 ( ) at premium 1 ( ). Then, recalling 1 < T , other less reliable consumer-types exist and, by (ii), these types take out strictly more insurance as 1 at 1 ( ) : So Lemma 5 can be applied, which shows that an entrant can charge an arbitrarily smaller premium than 1 ( ), and yet incur unit cost bounded strictly below c, thus making a pro…t (since, by the de…nitiion of equilibrium, incumbent …rms N 1 ( ) at level 1 in , whose unit costs were c; made no losses in the equilibrium prior to his entry), and contradicting that is an equilibrium. Thus 1 takes out Q 1 ( ) units of insurance. Then, by (ii), so do all other types; and the unit cost at level 1 of is P T t=1 t p t : By Lemma 6, 1 ( ) = P T t=1 t p t 1 : Next suppose that 1 wants to take out more insurance than Q 1 ( ) at premium 1 : Let an entrant come in and o¤er ( 1 + "; "). For small enough "; all types will take out full insurance (post-entry) on the …rst level 1 ( ) and furthermore, by (ii) and the fact that 1 + " < 2 ( ); full insurance also from the entrant. The entrant will therefore incur unit cost P T t=1 t p t 1 ; but earn the premium 1 + ", making a pro…t, a contradiction. This proves that Q 1 ( ) = Q 1 :
Finally we turn to the case that 1 = T; i.e., 1 is the solo type taking out insurance at : By Lemma 6, 1 ( ) = 1 p 1 1 : Clearly 1 will not take out more insurance than Q 1 : If he takes out less (because less is o¤ered, i.e., Q 1 ( ) < Q 1 ) , an entrant can come in and o¤er ( 1 + "; ") ; get full subscription, with premium 1 +" exceeding unit cost 1 p 1 ; and thus making a pro…t, a contradiction. Now suppose, inductively, that i ( ) = i and Q i ( ) = Q i for types types i = 1; : : : ; l and consider type l+1 < L. Repeat the argument given above, replacing type 1; : : : ; T by types l + 1; : : : ; T ( i.e., just drop the types 1; : : : ; l from the picture and commence with type l + 1 looking "ahead"on ( )) to conclude that l+1 ( ) = l+1 and Q l+1 ( ) = Q l+1 .
Remarks
(1) (Beyond the Pro-Rata Rule) When a consumer is indi¤erent between several …rms ( ; Q i ) i2I , and wants z < P i2I Q i units of insurance at the common premium quoted by them, we could let the consumer choose how much insurance to take out from the di¤erent …rms, instead of stipulating the pro rata rule that he take out Q j = P i2I Q i z from j 2 I. This would be tantamount to allowing the distribution of z among I to be arbitrary (subject to the upper bounds Q i ):However, in this case, we shall need to be careful in delineating the expectations that an entrant may entertain regarding the consumer-types it can attract. If its expectations are allowed to be too optimistic, in particular if it can cherry-pick amongst all those customers who like its contract at least as much as their current ones, then equilibrium will fail to exist. Some tempering of its optimism is needed in order to uphold equilibrium. One natural constraint is that the entrant should expect to get precisely those customers who strictly bene…t by coming to it, i.e., it cannot cherry pick amongst them, but must accomodate all. At the same time impose the additional constraint that, on account of an implicit "cost of moving", those customers who are indi¤erent between the entrant and their current insurers will stay where they are. With this de…nition, all our results remain intact by the same arguments (with the obvious changes). The entrant could even turn pessimistic and make the assumption that, amongst those indi¤erent to it, only the most unreliable ones will present themselves at its door (alongside, of course, all those who strictly bene…t). This, too, will leave our results intact.
(2) (Pretending to be Many Firms, i.e. Menus) We can allow each (incumbent or entrant) …rm to issue as many elementary contracts ( ; Q) as it likes, i.e., allow its strategy set to be [
n : This will not alter equilibrium. To see this, consider a …rm that issues ( 1 ; Q 1 ); : : : ; ( m ; Q m ) with 1 < : : : < m as part of a strategy pro…le : Let the …rm unilaterally withdraw any one of its contracts ( j ; Q j ) : A moment's relection reveals that the clientale it will get at ( 1 ; Q 1 ); : : : ; ( j 1 ; Q j 1 ) will remain una¤ected, while the reliability mix of the clientale it will get at ( j+1 ; Q j+1 ); : : : ; ( m ; Q m ) will not worsen, thus not worsening the pro…tability of every remaining contract. We conclude that an entrant can make a pro…t via a menu only if it can make a pro…t via a single contract. Moreover, if an incumbent makes a negative pro…t on one of its contracts, then it must make a positive pro…t on another one of its contracts (since it cannot make losses in equilibrium). But then by our standard argument, an entrant can come and make a positive pro…t as well.
(3) (Mixing Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Contracts Destroys Equilibrium): Suppose, for simplicity, that there are just two consumer-types. An entrant …rm can always break our primary-secondary equilibrium by the strategem of issuing an exclusive contract that will lure only the reliable and enable them to consume above their -level. (The unreliable are kept at bay, because the quantity limit of the entrant is too restrictive for them). Moreover, as may be readily veri…ed, the entrant's premium in this stratagem can be set higher than 1 p 1 + 2 p 2 ; hence it will make a pro…t. Conversely the separating equilibrium 0 of [8] can be broken whenever the consumption of the reliable at is better than her consumption at 0 : For, in this case, an entrant can intervene in 0 with the o¤er of the same quantity as the primary contract of and a premium that is slightly higher, get both types to fully subscribe to it and thereby make a pro…t.
(4) (Welfare Comparisons) Clearly the unreliable are always better o¤ at the primary-secondary equilibrium than at the separating equilibrium 0 : If the reliable are su¢ ciently numerous compared to the unreliable, then it is easy to see that they too will prefer to 0 ; with the upshot that Pareto-dominates 0 : On the other hand, if the unreliable constitute the bulk of the population, one can still say that dominates 0 from the "majoritarian"point-of-view. (5) (General Adverse Selection with Ranked Consumers) The arguments we have given do not depend on the particulars of the underlying insurance market. Let us suppose that …rms sell quantities of a commodity to consumers. Firm n sets a price n and a quantity limit Q n : Consumers can buy from as many …rms as they want, up to the prescribed quantity limits. What is essential for our analysis to remain intact is that the consumer types can be ranked in the same order 1; :::; T in two senses. First, given any vector of …rm o¤ers, the quantities purchased at any price are weakly increasing in consumer type t; (and strictly increasing if the total quantity limit available at the price is not exhausted). Second, we need to suppose that the constant marginal cost c t of producing the good for type is also increasing in t: See [3] for an excellent analysis, carried out in this general framework.
